

BROOKLYN COLLEGE
OF
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
BROOKLYN 10, NEW YORK

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
AND ANTHROPOLOGY

Home address:

ALFRED MCCLUNG LEE
100 HEMLOCK ROAD
SHORT HILLS, N.J. 07078

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Dear Franco:

The first chapter of your work on Max Weber has arrived, and I have enjoyed thoroughly your fresh and challenging analysis of that worthy. Since I am not a special student of Weber, I do not know how helpful my observations on your fine treatise will be, but I am happy to send them along, **brashly** hoping that they may be of some interest to you. Here they are:

When you say on p. 1 that Weber is being "imbalsamato," I immediately thought of the distortions of his thought in the writings **of** that sick person, Talcott Parsons. I am sure the only way to get an adequate impression of Weber or of anyone else in another language is to read his work in the original. Our translators of Weber, self-selected naturally, have not been happy ones, I am sure. They include, as you know, Parsons, Shils, Gerth in particular, a choice Weber surely would not have preferred. They have embalmed Weber in their own ways and for their **own** psychoneurotic purposes for their professional colleagues in this country. I hope very much, therefore, that your work on Weber may be published in English.

My most general observations on Weber and not on your interpretation **of** Weber are that he lacks an adequate conception of society, group, and culture on **the** one hand and of individual (socialized) psychology on the other. For the former, in my estimation, he could have learned from the Kulturge**schichte** folks a lot more than he did and also from Spencer and Sumner. For the latter, he had the usual European handicap of disciplines falling into too precise pigeonholes.

Your own political experience is invaluable in giving you the knowledge from experience with which to perceive the shortcomings of Weber's analyses of politics. As you say, he is or at least tried to be a non-political man. As you say, this is a tragic aspect of his **intellectual** life. As I see your discussion, Weber was caught in an impossible dilemma. He was smart enough to realize what politics means, at least to a point, but German intellectualism placed the realities of politics outside of the real **Ken** of the German intellectual. He could scarcely recognize what he actually perceived.

Weber's preoccupation with the autonomy of sociology is one which concerns some American sociologists but not too many. This is a problem that concerns sociologists only in countries where autonomy, [↑] as I see it, means a job and a professional future. In [↑] in the sense of a defensible separate discipline within social science,

countries where a reasonable degree of interdisciplinary mobility is possible, such a preoccupation is not likely to be found. This is something different from a specialist's sense of social and intellectual autonomy as an intellectual or as a scientist.

You say that Weber frees science from the task attributed to it by simple-minded positivism: that of donor of happiness to man, of a new faith in substitution for ancient revelations. He does this, of course, by contending that the real social scientist is value-free, nonpolitical, extra-societal as it were. If he had been a more careful student of society and less prone to accept such a new absolutist idea as a replacement for the ones he had rid himself of, he would not have become the advocate of a position which is just as unconscionably exploitable as is any great philosophical ideal--whether it be democracy, Christian charity, or whatnot.

Alvin Gouldner's rather sloppy article, "Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Sociology," published in SOCIAL PROBLEMS, vol. 9, pp. 199-213, deals rather well with Weber's ideal. I just wish that Gouldner had written the piece a little better.

De Marchi's ideas on Weber and Einstein are at such great odds to those of Parsons and others in the U.S. that I think you might wish to mention the contrast. De Marchi, as I get it, contends that Einstein and Weber take an identical way of getting out of dogmatism, that of relativity. Weber is not, of course, a really thorough-going relativist. If he were, he would never have come out so strongly for freedom from values on the part of the scientist. He would have realized the impossibility of such a stance and also the possibly destructive uses to which any such absolute ideal might readily be put.

Weber's most noisy followers in this country are typically not relativists, at least not relativists by my cannons. Parsons, in his STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION (McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1937), p. 593, touches upon the difficulty when he says that "the principle of value relevance combined with that of the relativity of value systems introduces an element of relativity into the social sciences which raises in an acute form the question of their claim to objectivity."

The struggle to participate in the authority-giving magic of "science" and "objectivity" does a lot to destroy the usefulness of sociological efforts.

On page 31, you say that the unity of the sciences rests on the common observance of the principle of causality as an instrument of understanding. This reminds me of the seminar conducted by the late L. J. Henderson, a biologist, at Harvard, in which he used V. Pareto's GENERAL TREATISE as his principal text; it was a seminar in methodology that attracted students from many fields. I never attended it, but I have of course read Pareto's book. It seems to me that Pareto's critical discussion of methods of research and analysis was useful to people studying a range of physical, biological, and social science problems because all methodological problems are more acute, more difficult, but not basically otherwise different in the highly indeterminate field of sociology. Weber's efforts to differentiate the "natural" from the "social" are other

relics of his intellectual past.

With regard to Weber's theory of culture, I think it might be useful to contrast his with those of others, such as those of Tylor, Spencer, and Sumner. My revision of such theories in such works as LA SOCIOLOGIA DELLE COMUNICAZIONI brings them more into line with modern social data and psychological theory. I am developing this revision further in my forthcoming book, MAN IN MULTIVALENT SOCIETY, along lines I have indicated in the Italian book mentioned and in a series of papers published in a variety of journals.

When Weber takes the position that man does not have nature in the sense that a plant or stone has nature; man has history, makes history, lives and is realized by and cannot evade history; he is making a point based upon an inadequate ~~man~~ recognition of the role of history in biology and mineralogy, in my estimation. We can learn something about a plant through studying a fairly homogeneous group of specimens of that plant, but we can learn a great deal more by studying the individual specimens as ~~examples of the~~ ~~phenomena which are now occurring~~ still photographs, as it were, of a phase or an instant in a biological process. Stones usually have greater stability than biological forms, but they can best be understood as temporary physical forms, to be ~~understood~~ understood as phases in a physical process. Work now being done in physical and biological laboratories is showing more and more the extent to which even physical reactions are relative to the conditions in which they take place. The simulation of conditions on the Moon, in space, and on other planets and use of such conditions as the ambient of physical and biological experiments ~~are~~ are extending and refining ideas on relativity in those fields.

The "mescolanza di valori nemici" that bothered Weber was one of the things that drew me into sociology and on which I have devoted a lot of time. My own theory of culture-and-personality thus is centered around the conceptions of "multivalence" in self, person, and society. Weber, like many, gives the impression of the mixture being an evil to be met through increasing ~~consciousness and rationality~~ ~~consciousness and rationality~~ consciousness and rationality. This is psychologically and sociologically naïve, in my estimation. First we have to see clearly what the "mixture" consists of, where it comes from, how it is adjusted to, etc. These are some of the things I have tried to do. These matters are treated rather briefly in our MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY. A key point in the theory is the significance of "prototypical groups."

Viewed from the standpoint of carefully considered life-histories, etc., just how much choice among values does an individual have? Aren't most choices foreclosed by habitual patterns of thought, emotion, and behavior taken on by the individual during the socialization processes of a given society and social status group? And aren't these habitual patterns quite close in their resemblance to the cultural and subcultural patterns of which they are copies?

If you did not write English so well, I would suggest that your Weber MS. be translated into English for publication as a book, but I am sure you can translate it much better than anyone

else. I should think that the ideal series to publish it in would be that of the Free Press of Glencoe, 60 Fifth Avenue, New York 3, N.Y. If you want me to be of assistance in bringing it to their attention or the attention of some comparable publisher, please let me know, and I will do what I can. It would probably be best to have at least part of the English MS. to show to them before initiating talks.

I should tell you that I am gradually severing my connections with the Thomas Y. Crowell Co. I have agreed to continue only in connection with books contracted as a result of my efforts. My chief reason for thus terminating my connections with them is that it took too much time, and their publishing interests are largely limited to the textbook field while my own interests also include ~~the~~ non-textbook non-fiction treatises.

As a writer and editor, I think I shall be more free when I am not tied up with one publisher. I think I have missed a few good opportunities as a result of that connection. My relations with Crowell naturally remain friendly, and I feel sure they will handle your industrial sociology book well.


All goes well here now even though Betty had a very difficult summer, as I may have mentioned. Now that our sons have both ~~■~~ moved away, with their Lares, Penates, wives, and children, we are having fun keeping house alone again for a change.
~~■■■■■■■■■■~~

Herewith I am returning your MS. I am looking forward to seeing the rest of the chapters very keenly.

Congratulations on your excellent products.

With best wishes to your wife, family, and self,

Sincerely,



ALFRED MCCLUNG LEE
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